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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000562

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PREL](#) [EU](#) [MARR](#) [PREF](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)

SUBJECT: EU TROIKA REP ON CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMICS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1273

[1](#)B. NDJAMENA 536

[1](#)C. NDJAMENA 522

[1](#)D. NDJAMENA 503

[1](#)E. NDJAMENA 485

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (SBU) EU Special Chad Rep Georg Lennkh gave DCM a November 24 read-out of the recent UN/AU-sponsored Darfur civil society conference in Doha, which he attended. Lennkh emphasized that public statements from both Chad and Sudan at the Doha event confirmed the three-step sequence of confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed in N'Djamena October 10 (reftels), and provided the international community with further means to engage both Sudan and Chad so that they would carry out respective responsibilities. He urged the U.S. to step up pressure on Sudan in the aim of achieving cantonment of remaining Chadian rebels well inside Darfur, the first of the three bilateral CBMs. Lennkh indicated that he believed Chad's commitment to ending military support for the JEM was sincere.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Lennkh plans to travel to Washington in the coming weeks to discuss international equities in Chad's electoral process with Department and other officials. We will advise if we learn more about his onward travel plans. We also intend to see Faki upon his return to N'Djamena; MFA officials who accompanied Faki to Doha have told us that Faki and Sudanese Presidential Advisor Ghazi remain in close and cordial contact on the CMB process. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)3. (SBU) An EU Troika delegation headed by Special Representative for Chad Georg Lennkh, in N'Djamena to learn more about the status of preparations for 2010-2011 elections, met with DCM November 24, inter alia describing last week's civil society conference in Doha arranged by UN/AU Darfur Negotiator Djibrill Bassole. Lennkh said he had spoken with both Chadian FM Faki and Sudanese Presidential Rep Ghazi Salahhudin in Doha, as well as with Bassole. Lennkh noted that both sides seemed to appreciate that the task confronting Sudan -- to canton Chadian rebels well inside Sudan in a location with sufficient amenities that they would not return to border areas -- presented

significant challenges. He urged the U.S. to maintain pressure on Sudan so that momentum would not flag.

¶4. (SBU) The Chadian side was patient, continued Lennkh, and wanted to give the Sudan side sufficient time to do the job correctly. This said, the Chadians seemed to be increasingly nervous that Sudan would cut corners, either by design or because of the logistic difficulties of the task before it. Thus Faki had proposed to Ghazi that international representatives be permitted to observe the cantonment effort, and to accompany Chadian "verifiers" of the final result, so that a judgment on what the Sudanese had managed to do would not boil down to Chad's word against Sudan's. Faki had also made clear that Chad would welcome international observers of its own follow-on effort to eliminate vestiges of JEM military presence in Chad, and would also welcome international witnesses to Sudan's eventual verification mission to assess Chad's efforts in that regard.

¶5. (SBU) Ghazi had said he saw no problem with Faki's proposal of international observers, Lennkh stressed, adding that Ghazi personally struck him as an honest broker. But those on the Sudan side who continued to distrust Chad were apparently using Faki's request for international observers as an excuse to reiterate assertions to the international media that Chad was dragging its feet with regard to the set of bilateral initiatives agreed in N'Djamena October 10. Asked who on the Sudan side was repeatedly -- and erroneously -- advising the media that the ball was in Chad's court, Lennkh indicated that he assumed the NCP was to blame.

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¶6. (SBU) Lennkh offered that public statements from both sides issued in Doha were the first open acknowledgments that a three-step process had been agreed in N'Djamena, with Sudan to take the first step (cantonment of Chadian rebels), Chad to take the second (elimination of JEM military facilities, subject to Sudanese verification), and Faki himself to take the third (a visit to Khartoum to discuss additional measures). In Lennkh's view, the international community should use the Doha statements to press the two sides -- particularly Sudan -- to hasten their efforts. Lennkh also said that he viewed Chad's tacit admission of past involvement with the JEM, and avowed desire to sever remaining military links, as credible and significant.

¶7. (SBU) Lennkh plans to travel to Washington in the coming weeks to discuss international equities in Chad's electoral process with Department and other officials. Although he said that his staff would be in touch directly, we will advise if we learn more of his onward travel plans. Meanwhile, we intend to see Faki -- who remains in travel status himself -- upon his return to Chad, to continue discussions of the Doha process and other matters. MFA officials who accompanied Faki to Doha have confirmed that Faki maintains cordial and frequent contact with Ghazi even while on the road.

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